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I. INTRODUCTION
In the interest of equal protection and justice, injured plaintiffs
are no longer limited in their ability to recover damages for their
pain and suffering. The abolition of previously imposed non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice cases throughout the
United States marks a dynamic example of the courts’ shift towards
favoring more complete compensation for the most severely injured
plaintiffs over the state’s interest in discouraging exorbitant damage
awards and managing insurance premiums. Development of the law
tends “to generate litigation in which the limits of revised principles
are tested.”1 The issue of the legality of non-economic damage caps
in personal injury cases demonstrates the principle that developments in the legal system tend to result in legal disputes.2 Questions
regarding the constitutionality of non-economic damage caps have
been continuously litigated throughout both the United States and
Canada. This has led to significant controversy between the most
severely injured plaintiffs seeking compensation for their pain and
suffering and the defendants being held liable in such cases. In the
case of non-economic damage caps, the courts in Canada reference
legal developments in the United States when resolving its own similar legal issues.
This article explores the current constitutionality of caps on noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice actions in Florida

1

Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Compensation
for Non-Pecuniary Losses, 76 L.R.C. 1, 5 (1984).
2
See id.
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and across various Canadian provinces.3 Part I provides an introduction to the current non-economic damage caps climate and the most
significant decisions shaping that climate. Part II discusses the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v.
Kalitan,4 and the precedent relied on by the Kalitan court, Estate of
McCall v. United States.5 Part III begins with a comparative introduction to the United States and Canadian legal systems and discusses the background and precedent that established the non-pecuniary damage award caps in Canada. Part IV compares the constitutional challenges made to the caps in both Florida and Canadian
provinces, and the court’s’ reasoning in each case. Part V discusses
the likelihood that the Supreme Court of Canada will similarly find
non-pecuniary damage award caps in medical malpractice actions
unconstitutional as an Equal Protection violation. This article concludes with a prediction that Canada will follow in the footsteps of
the United States and rule that non-pecuniary damage award caps
are unconstitutional.
The United States plays a central role in the controversy surrounding non-economic damage award caps and has long been considered the trendsetter for the judicial systems of other countries ‘on
this issue.6 In the United States, non-economic damages, also referred to as non-pecuniary damages, are characterized as non-monetary, intangible losses suffered by an injured plaintiff.7 Non-economic damage awards are intended to “make the plaintiff whole” by
compensating the plaintiff for “non-pecuniary harm caused by malpractice.”8 Non-economic damages and non-pecuniary damages are

3

See generally N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017).
Id.
5
See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 894 (Fla. 2014).
6
Selina Koonar, Justice Systems in Canada and the United States,
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL983500pub/newsletter/200906/koonar.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2018)
(“Canada’s legal system is quite open to using case precedents from both England
and the United States when there are insufficient ones in the realm of Canadian
law.”).
7
See Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Litigation: Finding a Solution That Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17 NEXUS: CHAP.
J. OF L. & POL’Y 135, 136 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8
Id.
4
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one in the same.9 Non-pecuniary harm includes the following: “pain
and suffering, mental and emotional anguish, inconvenience, decreased quality of life, and loss of consortium, society, companionship, love, and affection.”10 Non-economic damages “cannot be
compensated solely based on the principle of restitution in integrum,”11 meaning that the plaintiff cannot be restored to his or her
original position had no injury been suffered.12 As non-economic
damages are not quantifiable, the calculation of non-economic damage awards is difficult and uncertain.13 Further, “[s]ince no ‘objective yardstick’ exists for gauging non-pecuniary damages into monetary value, this form of damages is characterized by vastly lavish
claims.”14 The jury may award non-economic damages at its discretion based on the circumstances of each individual case.15 In an effort to counterbalance this wide discretion, legislatures have created
non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice claims in an effort to limit the plaintiff’s recovery and ensure judicial uniformity
and fairness.16
In Kalitan, a Florida plaintiff, Susan Kalitan, brought a medical
malpractice action against multiple defendants, seeking damages for
severe injuries suffered after carpal tunnel surgery.17 The case was
first filed in June of 2008, and the trial court reached a’ verdict in
June of 2011.18 The jury awarded Kalitan more than USD $4.7 million; however, the trial court reduced the non-economic damages
9

Id.
Id.
11
Donna Benedek, Non-Pecuniary Damages: Defined, Assessed and
Capped, 32 R. J. T. n.s. 607, 616 (1998).
12
What is RESTITUTIO IN INTREGRUM?, THE L. DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/restitutio-in-integrum/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
13
Fish, supra note 7, at 137.
14
Benedek, supra note 11, at 617; Herbert Kritzer, Guangya Liu & Neil Vidmar, An Exploration of “Noneconomic” Damages in Civil Jury Awards, 55 WM.
& MARY L. Rᴇᴠ. 971, 976 (2014) (“Critics claim that the non-economic portion of
awards if often much greater than the actual economic loss, suggesting that emotion rather than reason influence juries.”); Lee v. Dawson, [2006] B.C.J. No. 679,
para. 8 (Can.) (awarding CAD $2,000,000 in non-pecuniary damages, which was
later reduced to CAD $294,600).“”“”
15
Benedek, supra note 11, at 617–18.
16
Fish, supra note 7, at 137.
17
N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 50 (Fla. 2017).
18
Barry Univ., Inc., v. Kalitan, 2012 WL 6962692 1, 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
10
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award by nearly USD $3.3 million.19 In July of 2015, the defendants
appealed the trial court’s decision.20 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal directed the trial court to reinstate the total damages awarded
by the jury, holding that “[p]er McCall, Plaintiff’s non-economic
damages were improperly limited by the application of the caps in
[S]ection 766.118.”21 Subsequently, in 2017, the Supreme Court of
Florida granted review, holding that the statutory limits22 imposed
on non-economic damages in medical negligence suits violated the
Florida Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause’s provision that “all
natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law.”23
The court’s decision relied heavily on the court’s previous decision
in McCall,24 reasoning that to arbitrarily reduce a plaintiff’s compensation, regardless of the degree of injury suffered by the plaintiff,
bore no rational relationship to the State of Florida’s interest in addressing the medical malpractice crisis.25 The Florida Legislature
feared that exorbitant non-economic damage awards would result in
increased medical malpractice liability insurance rates, forcing physicians to practice without insurance, avoid risky operations, retire
prematurely, or flee Florida altogether.26
Similar to the courts in the United States, the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded that because “non-pecuniary damages is the area
where the risk of an excessive burden of expense is most significant,
it is in turn the domain where there is the clearest grounds for moderation.”27 Because “[n]o money can provide true restitution” for

19

Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 52.
Id. at 56.
21
Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 909 (Fla. 2014).
22
Benedek, supra note 11, at 617–18.§ §
23
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
24
See McCall, 134 So. 3d at 894.
25
N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 56 (Fla. 2017).
26
McCall, 134 So. 3d at 909.
27
Benedek, supra note 11 at 617–18; see also Peter C. Coyte et al., Medical
Malpractice–The Canadian Experience, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89, 89 (1991).
20
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non-pecuniary damages, awards may be extravagant as they are determined through a qualitative jury inquiry.28 Constitutional challenges to the statutorily imposed non-economic damage caps continue to flood courtrooms throughout the United States and Canada.29
In British Columbia, Canada, in Lee v. Dawson,30 the plaintiff,
Ik Sang Lee, brought a personal injury claim against multiple defendants for severe injuries suffered in an automobile accident.31
There, the jury awarded Lee CAD $2,000,000 in non-pecuniary
damages.32 This greatly exceeded the legally imposed non-pecuniary damage cap, which was then CAD $294,600.33 The trial judge
reduced the non-pecuniary damage award to the rough upper limit,
and Lee appealed to the Canadian Court of Appeals.34 Lee argued
that the non-pecuniary damage cap violated the equal protection
guarantee of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.35 The
Court of Appeals held that it was bound by stare decisis,36 namely,
a trilogy of Canadian Supreme Court cases,37 and as a result, tbe
Court of Appeals could not rule in Lee’s favor.38 However, the Court
of Appeals reasoned that “the rationalization or conceptual underpinning for having a rough upper limit on non-pecuniary damages

28

Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 261 (Can.)
(considering factors including compensation for physical and mental pain and suffering endured and to be endured, loss of amenities and enjoyment of life, and
loss of expectation of life).
29
Benedek, supra note 11, at 611.
30
Lee v. Dawson, [2006] B.C.J . No. 679, para. 2 (Can.).
31
Id.
32
Id. at para. 8.
33
Id. at para. 1.
34
Id.
35
Id. at para. 17 (explaining that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is equivalent to the United States Bill of Rights).
36
See discussion of the principle of stare decisis infra.
37
See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 261
(Can.); see Thornton v. Prince George School Dist. No. 57, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267,
267 (Can.); see Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 288 (Can.).
38
Lee v. Dawson, [2006] B.C.J. No. 679, para. 90 (stating that in 1978, the
Supreme Court of Canada decided a trilogy of cases, establishing non-pecuniary
damage award caps).
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[should] be re-examined.”39 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear Lee without reason.40 In declining to hear Lee,
the Supreme Court of Canada forfeited its opportunity to examine
the constitutionality of the non-pecuniary damage caps imposed by
its precedent.
II. BACKGROUND
Exploring the American and Canadian courts’ treatment of the
damage cap requires a basic understanding of the structure and function of both nations’ court systems and underpinnings of tort awards.
A. The United States Federal Court System: An Overview
The United States Court System has “two parallel and sovereign
judicial systems.”41 The federal system applies federal laws, while
the state system applies state laws.42 The primary role of the court
in the United States is to “decide what really happened” in a particular controversy and “what should be done about it.”43 The United
States is a democracy comprised of fifty states.44 The Supreme
Court is the chief court in the United States.45 There are a total of
ninety four district trial courts and thirteen appellate courts below
the Supreme Court.46 The ninety four district trial courts are divided
into twelve regional circuits.47 Each regional circuit has its own appellate court.48 The role of the appellate court is to determine if the
39

Id.
Matthew Good, Non-Pecuniary Damage Awards in Canada–Revisiting the
Law and Theory on Caps, Compensation and Awards at Large, 34 THE ADVOC.
Q. 389, 390–91 (2008).
41
Koonar, supra note 6.
42
Id.
43
ADMIN.
OFF.
U.S.
CTS.,
Court
Role
and
Structure,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
44
See generally About the Organization of the U.S. Government, U.S.A.GOV
(Updated March 21, 2018), https://www.usa.gov/organization-of-the-us-government.
45
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 43.
46
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 43.
47
Id.
48
Id.
40
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lower court correctly applied the law.49 Appellate court decisions
are made by a panel of three judges, rather than a jury.50 The district
courts “resolve disputes by determining the facts and applying legal
principles to decide who is right.”51 Typically, a district court judge
tries the case, and the jury makes the ultimate decision.52
Stare decisis, one of the most basic principles of the United
States judicial system, is “the notion that courts will follow prior
decisions of the same or higher courts unless sound reasons exist for
departure.”53 Stare decisis ensures that judicial decisions are “based
on sound principle rather than personal opinion.”54 Stare decisis
“promotes predictability[,] . . . institutional stability and efficiency.”55 Further, “[a] system of binding precedent also creates impetus for judges to state reasons and principles for distinguishing
current decisions from past ones, and to push to get the defects in
past opinions corrected.”56 The Supreme Court of the United States
typically defers to its past decisions when making future decisions.57
However, the Supreme Court may decide to depart from the doctrine
of stare decisis if a previous decision is “unsound”58 or “unworkable.”59 In addition, the Supreme Court considers an evolving understanding of the circumstances “now versus the time the precedent
was decided.”60 The Supreme “Court repeatedly has cautioned that

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id.
52
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 43.
53
Arthur H. Bryant & Richard Frankel, Comments on Proposed Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 32.1, TLPJ FOUND. 1, 6 (Feb. 14, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/03-AP-406.pdf.
54
Id.
55
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 411, 464 (2010).
56
Bryant & Frankel, supra note 53.
57
Timothy Oyen, Stare Decisis, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. (Updated Mar., 2017), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis.
58
Kozel, supra note 55, at 416 (meaning that “the Court might explain its
decision to overrule a precedent by asserting that the precedent is ‘badly reasoned.’”).
59
Oyen, supra note 57 (meaning that decisions may be “unworkable” when
the legal theory cannot be fairly applied to real cases).
60
Kozel, supra note 55, at 426.
50
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stare decisis is a flexible ‘principle of policy’ as opposed to ‘an inexorable command.’”61 The Supreme Court has moved away from
a strict “legalistic theory” and now “anchor[s] the law to new social,
economic and political concepts, which have taken form in the slow
process of social change.”62 Like the Supreme Court, most appellate
courts have maintained the presumption against overruling established precedent.63 “There appears to be a widespread assumption
that statutory stare decisis is simply part of our interpretive doctrine.”64
B. The Canadian Federal Court System: An Overview
Although the Canadian and American system both originate
from the common law system, the two Federal Court systems have
key differences.65 Unlike in the United States, the Canadian system
is a unified system, meaning that the Supreme Court of Canada and
all lower courts are part of the same system.66 Like the American
system, the primary role of Canadian courts is to administer justice.67 Canadian courts interpret and apply Canada’s constitution,
common law, and government legislation.68 Canada is a constitutional monarchy comprised of ten provinces and three territories.69
Canada has four levels of courts, each with its own jurisdiction.70 In
each of the ten provinces, with the exception of Quebec, the Canadian judiciary consists of provincial and territorial courts, superior

61

Id. at 414.
Wendell E. Green, Stare Decisis and the Supreme Court of the United
States, 4 NAT’L B. J. 191, 195 (1946).
63
Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73
THE GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 327 (2004-2005).
64
Id. at 328.
65
Koonar, supra note 6.
66
Id.
67
GOV’T OF CAN., How Does Canada’s Court System Work?, DEP’T OF JUST.
(Updated Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/01.html
(“[S]ignificant societal changes may also prompt the Court to overrule precedent;
however, any decision to overrule precedent is exercised cautiously.”).
68
Id.
69
N.Y.U., Guide to Foreign and International Legal Citations, 1 J. OF INT’L
L. AND POL. 1, 26 (2006).
70
GOV’T OF CAN., How the Courts are Organized, DEP’T OF JUST. (Updated
July 27, 2017), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/02.html.
62
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courts, and courts of appeal.71 The highest court is the Supreme
Court of Canada, which presides over the entire judiciary system.72
The provincial and territorial courts manage most cases and are
established by provincial and territorial governments.73 Superior
courts have complete jurisdiction and handle more consequential
cases and hear appeals from the provincial and territorial courts.74
Provincial and territorial courts of appeal hear appeals from the decisions of the superior courts and the provincial and territorial
courts.75 The decisions of the court of appeals can only be appealed
to the Supreme Court of Canada.76 The Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeals correspond to the provincial and territorial
court systems.77 The judges of these courts of appeal travel across
Canada to hear cases involving actions rooted in federal statutes,
national security, and international affairs.78 The Federal Court acts
as Canada’s national trial court and may review the decisions of
most federal boards, commissions, and tribunals.79 The Federal
Court of Appeals reviews decisions of the Federal Court, Tax Court
of Canada, and judicial reviews of some federal tribunals.80 Again,
its decisions can only be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.81
The Supreme Court of Canada is the final court of appeal and has

71

See The Quebec Judicial System, EDUCALOI, https://www.educaloi.qc.ca/en/capsules/quebec-judicial-system (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). Quebec
has its own legal system based on French law and the Napoleonic Code. Id. The
Quebec court system includes municipal courts, the Court of Quebec, the Superior
Court of Quebec, and the Court of Appeal of Quebec. Id. The Supreme Court of
Canada is ultimately the highest court in Quebec. Id.
72
See generally N.Y.U., supra note 69.
73
GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 70.
74
Id. (finding that more serious civil and criminal cases “include divorce
cases and cases that involve large amounts of money”).
75
Id.
76
GOV’T OF CAN., Courts and Other Bodies Under Federal Jurisdiction,
DEP’T OF JUST. (Updated Sep. 22, 2016), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccsajc/03.html.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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jurisdiction over all actions.82 The Supreme Court has one Chief Justice and eight additional justices appointed by the federal government.83 The Supreme Court of Canada solely hears cases that it
deems to be of public and national significance.84 Once a case has
exhausted all available lower level appeals, the Supreme Court of
Canada still has discretion to grant or deny permission to appeal before it will hear a case.85 These requests for appeal can be granted or
denied by the Supreme Court of Canada without reason.86
In Canada, the principle of stare decisis is “the idea that courts
ought to stand by their previous decisions[,] . . . is not immutable.”87
Like its American counterpart, the Canadian judicial principle of
stare decisis is defined as “the doctrine of precedent, according to
which the rules formulated by judges in earlier decisions are to be
similarly applied to later cases.”88 The doctrine of stare decisis ensures judicial consistency and predictability in similar cases and
“that prior decisions of higher courts are binding on lower courts of
the same jurisdiction.”89 Lower courts are typically expected to follow all pronouncements of higher level courts.90 Today, the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as the provincial and territorial
courts of appeal, are not strictly bound by prior decisions.91 The Supreme Court of Canada may “overrule on its previous decision when
it is compelled to do so . . . .”92 The Supreme Court of Canada has
flexibility and can set aside or overrule previous decisions when
there is good reason.93 This more flexible application of stare decisis
doctrine allows the Canadian courts “to restate the law in keeping
82

GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 76.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. (noting that some situations warrant an automatic right to appeal).
86
Id.
87
Neil Guthrie, Stare Decisis Revisited, 31 ADVOC. Q. 448, 448 (2006).
88
John E.C. Brierley, Stare Decisis, HISTORICA CAN. (Updated July 24,
2015), http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/stare-decisis/.
89
Id.
90
Adryan J.W. Toth, Clarifying the Role of Precedent, 22 DALHOUSIE J. OF
LEGAL STUD. 34, 41 (2013).
91
Brierley, supra note 88.
92
Toth, supra note 90, at 42.
93
George F. Curtis, Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada, 12 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978).
83
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with changed wants and expectations in those areas where the law
has lagged behind the times.”94
C. The Fundamental Right of Equal Protection
Both the United States and Canada have Equal Protection
Clauses. In the context of equal protection, both the Supreme Court
of the United States and the Supreme Court of Canada share a common goal: “to reconcile the principal of equal protection with the
clear reality of the consequence of law making that legislation commonly impacts groups unevenly.”95
1. The American Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
declares that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”96 Similarly, the Florida
Constitution states that “all natural persons, female and male alike,
are equal before the law . . . .”97 The right to equal protection allows
all individuals “to stand before the law on equal terms . . . to enjoy
the same rights as belong to, and to bear the same burden as are
imposed upon others in a like situation.”98 When a government action is challenged on equal protection grounds, the court employs
one of three tests: the rational basis test, the intermediate scrutiny
test, or the strict scrutiny test.99 Which test applies is determined by
the type of legislative action in question.100

94

Id. at 14.
Joseph M. Pellicciotti, The Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection
in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis of the Standards for
Determining the Validity of Governmental Action, 5 TULSA J. OF COMP. & INT’L
L. 1, 7 (1997).
96
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
98
Caldwell v. Mann, 26 So.2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1946) (citing Southern Ry. Co.
v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412 (1910)).
99
Pellicciotti, supra note 95, at 3.
100
Id.
95
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2. The Canadian Equal Protection Clause
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the Canadian Constitution, has a similar Equal Protection Clause to that of
the United States Constitution.101 In addition, similar to the Florida
Constitution, one of the purposes of the British Columbia Human
Rights Code is to “promote a climate of understanding and mutual
respect where all are equal in dignity and rights.”102 Section Fifteen
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that “[e]very
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination . . . .”103 However, in Section One, the Charter provides a caveat
for legislation challenged as a violation of equal protection under
Section Fifteen.104 Section One states that equality rights are “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”105 Therefore,
a discriminatory legislative action may be constitutional if the action
is justified under Section One of the Charter.106 Unlike the United
States, when a government action is challenged on equal protection
grounds, the court always employs the same test to determine Section Fifteen of the Charter is violated.107 If a violation has occurred,
the court then considers whether Section One justifies the stated discrimination.108
Under the Canadian Constitution, judicial decisions are inconclusive.109 Meaning, “[t]he government can make the policy determination that a given law is necessary for the public welfare that it
should be enacted, despite the judiciary’s advice that the proposed
law violates the Charter.”110
101

See Constitution Act, 1982, C 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II,
no 44 (Can.)’.
102
Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 210 (Can).
103
Constitution Act, supra note 101’.
104
See Pellicciotti, supra note 95, at 6–7.
105
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
Id. at 7.
107
Id. at 8.
108
Id. at 9.
109
Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Canada: The Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1191, 1234 (1984).
110
Id.
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D. Non-Economic Damages: An Overview
Economic damages are easily quantifiable as they represent lost
earnings, which have monetary values.111 However, non-economic
damages, also referred to as non-pecuniary damages, as a general
matter, are not easily quantified because non-economic damages do
not represent financial (i.e., wage-based) losses.112 Non-economic
damages include the following: “pain and suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other non-financial losses to the extent
the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law,
including the Wrongful Death Act.”113 Non-economic losses have
no monetary or market value and are not determined on a monetary
scale.114 Although non-economic damages are non-financial, such
damages “symbolically affirm that the plaintiff has been wrongfully
deprived of something of value.”115 Non-economic damages “compensate the plaintiff through a symbolic sum” because the plaintiff
cannot be made whole.116 The “Canadian function approach” suggests that non-pecuniary damages “‘may somewhat re-establish the
plaintiff’s self-confidence, wipe out his sense of outrage,’ or ‘may
be a consolation, a solatium.’”117 This approach suggests that nonpecuniary damages provide solace, meaning a dollar amount “that
allows the plaintiff to purchase physical arrangements that can make
life more endurable in the face of the non-economic loss.”118
Nevertheless, calculating the appropriate amount of compensation for damages that have no monetary value is especially difficult.119 In both the United States and Canada, non-economic damage
awards are “within the jury’s discretion.”120 Fact finding is left to
111

See generally Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for Non-monetary Losses:
An Integrated Answer to the Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation
of Noneconomic Damages, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195 (2009).
112
FLA. STAT. § 766.202(8) (2017).
113
Id.
114
Zavos, supra note 111, at 196–99.
115
Id. at 197.
116
Id. at 198.
117
Id. at 197.
118
Id. at 245.
119
Jack Effron, A Comparative Study of Non-pecuniary Damages in Common
Law Countries, 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 211, 211 (1988).
120
Id. at 213–17.
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the jury so that it “can tailor the award to the unique circumstances
of the plaintiff’s injuries, as well as represent community standards.”121 Judgments by Canadian trial and appellate level courts
“suggest[] that non-pecuniary damages are calculated much like
pain and suffering damages in the United States. The court picks a
sum that it feels fairly represents the gravity, duration and effect of
the injuries on the plaintiff.”122
1. United States Non-Economic Damages
In the United States, non-economic damages are awarded to
compensate injured plaintiffs for their “pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium or companionship, and other intangible injuries.”123 Further, non-economic “damages involve no
direct economic loss and have no precise value.”124 In the United
States, non-economic damage limits in personal injury actions are
imposed by individual state statutes rather than by a uniform federal
law.125 Federally imposed damage caps would not be “subject to
challenge under state constitutions [or] vulnerable to federal constitutional challenges under existing precedents.”126 However, past
proposed legislation was never approved.127
Currently, only four states—Florida, Illinois, New Hampshire,
and Washington—have found non-economic damage caps in personal injury cases unconstitutional.128 Only eleven states impose
non-economic damage caps in general tort or personal injury
cases.129 In medical malpractice cases specifically, the following six
121

Id. at 213.
Id. at 218.
123
Noneconomic Damages Reform, ATRA, http://www.atra.org/issue/noneconomic-damages-reform/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
124
Id.
125
See generally Leonard J. Nelson, III, David J. Becker, & Michael A. Morrisey, Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L.MED. 443, 445 (2011).
126
Id. at 460.
127
Id.
128
N.Y. LAW SCH., Facts Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State
Law Summary, CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY AT N.Y. LAW SCH. (June 22,
2017), https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damages-statelaw-summary.
129
Id.
122
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states have found non-economic damage caps unconstitutional: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Washington.130 Over half of the United States, twenty six states to be exact,
impose non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice cases.131
2. Canadian Non-Pecuniary Damages
In Canada, non-pecuniary damages are awarded for the following non-quantifiable injuries: pain and suffering, loss of companionship, emotional distress, loss of life enjoyment, and loss of life expectancy, similar to non-economic damages in the United States.132
Mirroring their United States counterpart, non-pecuniary damages
in Canada are awarded for similar non-quantifiable injuries and in
order to put the plaintiff in the same position that he or she would
have been in but for the negligent injury.133 In order to obtain nonpecuniary damages, “the plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable or
fair function which the money claimed will serve.”134 In other
words, “non-pecuniary damages should be awarded only when they
can serve some useful purpose.”135 Both the United States and Canada place similar caps on non-economic damage awards.136
In Canada, non-pecuniary damage awards for pain and suffering
were limited to CAD $100,000 in 1978, which is currently upwards
of CAD $370,000 after adjustment for inflation.137 The damages cap

130

Id.; see Nelson, supra note 125, at 458.
N.Y. LAW SCH., supra note 128.
132
Katherine L. Ayre & D. Bruce Garrow, The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary
Damages in Canada: The Cap on Recovery, Jury Trials, and other Unique Considerations for General Damage Awards, CONF. ON INT’L AVIATION LIABILITY &
INS. 1, 3 (2009), http://monmexique.com/5-Garrow.pdf.
133
Id. at 3–4.
134
Lindal v. Lindal, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 629, 638 (Can.) (quoting Beverley M.
McLachlin, What Price Disability? A Perspective on the Law of Damages for
Personal Injury, 59 CAN. BAR REV. 1, 12 (1981)) (“[W]hat is a reasonable or fair
function may involve reference to the restitutionary concept of what the plaintiff
would have enjoyed or have been able to provide for his dependents had he not
been injured.”).
135
Lindal, 2 S.C.R. at 638.
136
See Ayre, supra note 132, at 4.
137
Id.; see Non-Pecuniary Damages Upper Limits, MCKELLAR STRUCTURED
SETTLEMENTS (2017), http://www.mckellar.com/statistics (last visited Oct. 1,
2018).
131
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is imposed regardless of the severity of the plaintiff’s injury.138 Factors that influence non-pecuniary damage awards include the following: age of the plaintiff; nature of the injury; severity and duration of pain; disability; emotional suffering; loss or impairment of
life; impairment of family, martial, and social relationships; impairment of physical and mental abilities; and loss of lifestyle.139 Factors
irrelevant to non-pecuniary damage awards include the following:
sympathy for the plaintiff, retribution against the defendant, emotional adjustment of the plaintiff, social status, income, or assets of
the plaintiff, and the sex of the plaintiff.140 In Andrews v. Grand &
Toy Alberta Ltd.,141 Justice Dickson, writing for the Supreme Court
of Canada, stated that “[t]he monetary evaluation of non-pecuniary
losses is a philosophical and policy exercise more than a legal or
logical one,” thereby illuminating the court’s prioritization of social
good over legal theory.142 To echo this tenet, Justice Dickson stated
that awards must be fair yet arbitrary because “[n]o money can provide true restitution” in cases of such great harm.143
III. CASE SUMMARY
A. The United States: The Fundamental Court Cases Barring
Non-Economic Damage Caps in Florida
On June 8, 2017, in Kalitan, which is now the current rule in
Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the statutory cap on
wrongful death non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions, under Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violated the right to

138

Ayre, supra note 132, at 4.
Stapely v. Hejslet, [2006] 34 B.C.C.A., ¶ 46 (Can).
140
Edward Veitch, The Implications of Lindal, 28 MCGILL L. J. 116, 122–23
(1982).
141
Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261.
142
Id. (“There is no medium of exchange for happiness. There is no market
for expectation of life.”).
143
Id.
139
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equal protection afforded by the Florida Constitution.144 The Supreme Court of Florida based its decision on McCall, another Supreme Court of Florida case decided just three years prior.145
In Kalitan, in 2011, plaintiff Susan Kalitan brought an action for
medical malpractice, arising from the negligence of multiple medical practitioners and other defendants.146 Suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome, Kalitan went to defendant North Broward Hospital
District for wrist surgery in 2007.147 After a complication of intubation for general anesthesia, Kalitan suffered a perforated esophagus.148 When Kalitan awakened from surgery, she complained of
extreme pain in her chest and back.149 The anesthesiologist administered medication for chest pain and discharged Kalitan.150 The following day, Kalitan was found unresponsive and was rushed to the
emergency room.151 Kalitan underwent lifesaving emergency surgery to repair her esophagus.152 Subsequently, Kalitan was in a medically induced coma in the intensive care unit for several weeks.153
Further, she required several additional surgeries and intensive therapy in order to regain mobility and the ability to eat normally.154
Kalitan testified to experiencing continuing pain, serious mental disorders, and loss of independence all caused by the traumatic incident.155
The jury awarded Kalitan a total of USD $4 million in non-economic damages: USD $2 million for past pain and suffering and
USD $2 million for future pain and suffering.156 However, the trial
court capped the non-economic damage award to around USD $2
144

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. (stating that all-natural persons are equal before the
law); Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56; McCall, 134 So. 3d at 900–01.
145
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56; McCall, 134 So. 3d at 894 (holding that the noneconomic damage award cap in wrongful death actions was unconstitutional as a
violation of equal protection).
146
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 50.
147
Id. at 51.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 51.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 52.
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million, in accordance with Section 766.118, Florida Statutes.157 In
addition, the trial court denied Kalitan’s challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory caps on non-economic damages in medical
negligence actions.158
In 2015, the Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the
trial court; instead, relying on McCall to hold that, in personal injury
medical malpractice actions, the statutory non-economic damage
award caps are unconstitutional.159 The Fourth District recognized
that although McCall was limited to the context of wrongful death
actions, the decision still applied in this case because Section
766.118, Florida Statutes, applies to both wrongful death and personal injury actions.160 Thus, the district court ordered the trial court
to issue the jury’s total damage award.161
The Supreme Court of Florida granted review of Kalitan, addressing the issue of the constitutionality of the non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice actions imposed by Sections
766.118(2) and (3), Florida Statutes.162 The court first looked to
McCall to decide its approach in Kalitan.163
In McCall, in 2014, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed
whether the statutory cap on non-economic damage awards set forth
in Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Florida Constitution.164 The plaintiff, Michelle
McCall, received prenatal care at a United States Air Force medical
157
See FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2011) (limiting non-economic damages for negligence of practitioner defendants and non-practitioner defendants); Kalitan, 219
So. 3d at 52.
158
See FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2011); Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 52.
159
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 51; McCall, 134 So. 3d at 894 (holding that the noneconomic damage award cap in wrongful death actions was unconstitutional).
160
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 52.
161
Id.
162
See FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2011) (limiting non-economic damage
awards for negligence of practitioners to $500,000, or $1 million for negligence
of practitioners resulting in a permanent vegetative state or death); see also FLA.
STAT. § 766.118(3) (2011) (limiting non-economic damage awards for negligence
of non-practitioners to USD $750,000, or $1.5 million for negligence of non-practitioners resulting in permanent vegetative state or death); Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at
52–53.
163
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 53–54.
164
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2011); see
also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(3) (2011); McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897.
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clinic.165 In her last trimester, McCall suffered from high blood pressure and severe preeclampsia.166 Her labor was induced by the family practice department, rather than the OB/GYN department, at Fort
Walton Beach Medical Center.167 McCall delivered a healthy baby
boy; however, the Air Force family practice physicians were unable
to manually extract her placenta.168 The Air Force family practice
physicians called Dr. Archibald, an Air Force obstetrician, for assistance.169 Unbeknownst to the family practice physicians, McCall’s
blood pressure began to drop rapidly.170 The nurse anesthetist reported to Dr. Archibald that McCall’s vitals were stable, failing to
inform Dr. Archibald of McCall’s dangerously low blood pressure.171 Dr. Archibald never checked McCall’s vital signs himself.172 Subsequently, McCall went into shock and cardiac arrest due
to severe blood loss and never recovered.173 The Estate of McCall
filed suit, and the district court concluded that the non-economic
damages totaled USD $2 million.174 In addition, the district court
limited the recovery of wrongful death non-economic damages to
USD $1 million in accordance with Section 766.118(2), Florida
Statutes.175 The district court denied the Estate’s constitutional challenge to the statutory cap on wrongful death non-economic damages
in medical malpractice actions.176 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the application and constitutionality of the statutory cap
under Article X of the Florida Constitution.177 However, the Eleventh Circuit granted the Estate’s motion to certify to the Supreme
Court of Florida the constitutionality of the statutory cap under the
Florida Constitution.178
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897.
Id.
Id. at 897–98.
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id. at 898.
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Id.
Id. at 899.
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Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
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The Supreme Court of Florida, in a plurality opinion, held that
the statutory cap on wrongful death non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions, under Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violated the right to equal protection afforded by the Florida Constitution.179 The court applied the rational basis test, stating that “a statute must bear a rational and reasonable relationship to a legitimate
state objection, and it cannot be [arbitrarily] or capriciously imposed.”180 The court reasoned that the statutory cap failed because
it imposed unfair and arbitrary burdens on injured plaintiffs when
there were multiple claimants.181 The greater the number of survivors and the greater their losses, the less likely they will be fully
compensated.182 In addition, the statutory cap did not bear a rational
relationship to its stated purpose: to address the medical malpractice
insurance crisis in Florida.183 The court reasoned that “the Legislature’s determination that the increase in medical malpractice liability insurance rates is forcing physicians to practice medicine without
professional liability insurance, to leave Florida, to not perform
high-risk procedures, or to retire early from the practice of medicine
[was] unsupported.”184 Further, even if Florida were facing a medical malpractice insurance crisis, the statutory caps would not alleviate such a crisis.185 Lastly, the plurality pointed out that statutes implemented during times of crisis may become invalid because times
of crisis are temporary.186 The concurring opinion agreed with the
plurality opinion’s application of the rational relationship test, stating that “the arbitrary reduction of survivors’ non-economic damages in wrongful death cases based on the number of survivors lacks
a rational relationship to the goal of reducing medical malpractice
premiums.”187

179
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. (stating that all-natural persons are equal before
the law); McCall, 134 So. 3d at 900–01.§
180
McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 902.
183
Id. at 901.
184
Id. at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185
McCall, 134 So. at 909.
186
Id. at 913.
187
Id. at 916.
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In Kalitan, the Supreme Court of Florida considered the applicability of McCall to the personal injury context.188 As in McCall, because Kalitan was not a member of a suspect class, the court applied
the rational basis test.189 The court held that the statutory caps on
non-economic damage awards in personal injury actions, imposed
by Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violated equal protection.190
The statutory cap failed the rational basis test because “the arbitrary
reduction of compensation without regard to the severity of the injury does not bear a rational relationship to the Legislature’s stated
interest in addressing the medical malpractice crisis.”191 The court
agreed with the plurality and concurring opinions in McCall that
there was no evidence of a continuing medical malpractice insurance crisis to warrant the necessary implementation of the statutory
cap.192 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that
Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, “unreasonably and arbitrarily
limit[s] recovery of those most grievously injured by medical negligence.”193 Because Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, was deemed
unconstitutional, it was subsequently amended, most recently in
2018.194
B. Canada: The Trilogy of Fundamental Court Cases
Establishing Canadian Tort Cap Law
1. Introduction to the Trilogy
Three cases—Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., Thornton
v. Prince George School Dist. No. 57, and Arnold v. Teno—created
the fundamental basis on which all following Canadian tort cap law
relies. All three cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Canada

188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 58.
See 2018 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2018-24 (C.S.C.S.S.B. 622) (West).
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in 1978, resulting in a “rough”195 upper limit on non-pecuniary damage awards in personal injury actions.196 Adopting a functional approach,197 the Supreme Court of Canada determined that non-pecuniary damage awards should provide “solace” to injured plaintiffs.198 Solace requires that money is “used to buy substitutes with
which to ameliorate the situation of the injured party,” meaning that
any monetary award must be used to mitigate an injured plaintiff’s
loss.199 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada created the rough
upper limits on non-pecuniary damage awards “as a result of the fear
of largely extravagant awards likely to create an immense social burden, as [was] presently the case in the United States, coupled with
the fact that non-pecuniary damage awards are susceptible to excessive claims, and that the victim has already been compensated for
pecuniary loss,”200 reflecting, once again, the trend of the Canadian
courts looking to the American courts for guidance.201 The non-pecuniary damage award caps were designed to make awarding damages straightforward, to prevent excessive jury awards, and to provide a reasonable scope for awards.202 The trilogy indicates the Supreme Court of Canada’s “willingness to group cases according to
the general issues they raise and to resolve these issues broadly,
providing guidance for lower courts.”203 Further, the trilogy echoes
the court’s interest in reasonable yet conventional non-pecuniary

195

Lee, B.C.C.A.159 at para. 10 (adjusting the set upper limit for inflation).
See id. at para. 1.
197
Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261–62 (viewing non-pecuniary damage awards from
a functional approach as “attempts to assess the compensation required to provide
the injured person ‘with reasonable solace for his misfortune’”).“‘’”
198
See Good, supra note 40, at 391–92.
199
See id. at 392; Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 262 (“‘Solace’ . . . mean[s] physical
arrangements which can make his life more endurable rather than ‘solace’ in the
sense of sympathy.”).
200
Benedek, supra note 11, at 637; Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261 (“This area is
open to widely extravagant claims. It is in this area that awards in the United
States have soared to dramatically high levels in recent years.”).“”
201
See Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261.
202
Good, supra note 40, at 392.
203
Bruce Feldthusen & Keith McNair, General Damages in Personal Injury
Suits: The Supreme Court’s Trilogy, 28 U. TORONTO L. J. 381, 382 (1978).
196

218

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:195

damage awards.204 Today, the trilogy is still considered to be good
law and acts as binding precedent on lower courts.205
a. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd.
In Andrews, a traffic accident left the plaintiff, James Andrews,
a quadriplegic, facing a lifetime of dependency.206 The trial court
awarded CAD $1,022,477.48 in damages, which was reduced by the
Court of Appeals to CAD $516,544.48.207 The Supreme Court of
Canada granted review as to the assessment of damages.208 The
court held that the plaintiff should be awarded CAD $100,000 in
non-pecuniary damages stating, “save in exceptional circumstances,
this should be regarded as an upper limit of non-pecuniary loss in
cases of this nature.”209 It is important to note that the Supreme
Court of Canada established only a “rough” upper limit, meaning
the limit could be exceeded in rare cases.210 After the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Andrews, “the search for solace through the
acquisition of goods and services became the aim of the compensation of non-pecuniary damages in accordance with the functional
view.”211 This trend was perpetuated by the two other cases in the
trilogy.
b. Thornton v. Prince George School Dist. No. 57
In Thornton, an accident in a physical education class left eighteen-year-old Gary Thornton a quadriplegic.212 Previously an allaround athlete, the plaintiff attempted to do a somersault when he
fractured his neck “with comminuted fracture of the fourth cervical
vertebrae.”213 The plaintiff’s injuries resulted in either “total or partial paralysis to each of his four limbs.”214 The trial court awarded
204

See Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261.
See Good, supra note 40, at 392.
206
See Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 229.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 233.
210
See Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, supra note 1.
211
Benedek, supra note 11, at 620.
212
Thornton, 2 S.C.R. at 267.
213
Id. at 271 (“Prior to the injury the appellant was 6 ft. 3 in. in height and
described in evidence as being the epitome of the all-round athlete.”).
214
Thornton, 2 S.C.R. at 271.
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CAD $1,534,058.93 in damages.215 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reduced the damages award to CAD $649,628.87.216 The Supreme Court of Canada granted review as to the assessment of damages.217 Citing Andrews, the court held that the award for non-pecuniary damages should be reduced to CAD $100,000 in accordance
with the rough upper limit.218 The court agreed with the Court of
Appeals stating that the non-pecuniary losses experienced by
Thornton were similar to that of the plaintiff in Andrews.219 The
court reasoned that the plaintiff could not be “awarded perfect compensation” and that fairness on each side was essential to the principles of judicial consistency and reasonableness.220
c. Arnold v. Teno
In Arnold, the four-and-a-half-year-old plaintiff, Diane Teno,
was struck by a car while crossing the street after purchasing ice
cream from an ice cream truck.221 Subsequently, Teno suffered significant physical and mental impairments.222 The trial court awarded
the plaintiff CAD $200,000 in non-pecuniary damages and CAD
$750,000 in pecuniary damages.223 The Court of Appeals lessened
the award for pecuniary damages by CAD $75,000.224 The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court of Canada granted review.225
The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “[t]here should be uniformity, always allowing flexibility to meet each differing individual case, in awards for non-pecuniary damages.”226 Citing Andrews
and Thornton, the court held that the award of CAD $100,000 in
non-pecuniary damages was proper in this case.227 The court’s reasoning involved a comparison between the plaintiff Teno’s injuries
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
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Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 275.
Arnold, 2 S.C.R. at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Arnold, 2 S.C.R. at 292.
Id. at 292–93.
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and the plaintiffs’ injuries in Andrews and Thornton.228 Like the
plaintiffs in Andrews and Thornton, the plaintiff in this case, although not paralyzed, suffered a significant physical and mental disability.229 Unlike the plaintiffs in Andrews and Thornton, the plaintiff in this case would not require frequent treatment; however, the
court reasoned that the award was proper because the plaintiff in this
case had a longer life expectancy and would suffer continuous embarrassment throughout her life.230 Further, the court emphasized the
soaring non-pecuniary damage awards in the United States as reasoning for capping the non-pecuniary damage award at the rough
upper limit.231
2. The Supreme Court of Canada’s Reasoning Behind
the Trilogy
Throughout the trilogy, the Supreme Court of Canada gave a
number of reasons for setting the upper limits on non-pecuniary
damage awards. First, the court was responding to escalating damages awards in the United States.232 Second, the court cited the need
for national consistency to damage awards.233 Third, the court
stressed the importance of considering the social burden of large
non-pecuniary damage awards.234
In Andrews and Arnold, both Justice Dickson and Justice Spence
respectively referenced soaring non-economic damage awards in the
United States as support for non-pecuniary damage caps in Canada.235 In Andrews, Justice Dickson stated that “the subject of damages for personal injury is an area of law which cries out for legislative reform.”236 Justice Dickson further noted that non-pecuniary
damage awards may be “widely extravagant,” observing that noneconomic damage awards had recently soared in the United
States.237 Likewise, in Arnold, Justice Spence referenced increasing
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Id.
Id.
Id.
Benedek, supra note 11, at 636.
Ayre, supra note 132, at 5.
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See Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261.
Id.; see also Arnold, 2 S.C.R. at 332.
Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 236.
Id. at 261.
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non-economic damage awards in the United States, specifically in
the area of medical malpractice.238 Justice Spence said, “We have a
right to fear a situation where none but the very wealthy could own
or drive automobiles because none but the very wealthy could afford
to pay the enormous insurance premiums which would be required
by insurers to meet such exorbitant awards.”239 Further, Justice
Spence agreed with Justice Dickson that the impossibility and subjectivity of assessment and compensation of such losses makes nonpecuniary damage caps necessary.240
In Andrews, Justice Dickson stressed the need for uniformity of
such awards throughout Canada, but noted that flexibility for greater
compensation was necessary in certain cases and under changing
economic circumstances.241 This again demonstrates the court’s prioritization of social good over legal theory.242 Justice Dickson stated
that such variation should not be determined by a victim’s province.243 Nevertheless, Justice Dickson emphasized the need for caps
or “guidelines for the translation into monetary terms what has been
lost.”244 Likewise, in Arnold, Justice Spence agreed with Justice
Dickson, citing “uniformity of awards” as a key reason for non-pecuniary damage limits; however, like Justice Dickson, Justice
Spence also emphasized the need for flexibility in certain cases.245
In Andrews, Justice Dickson emphasized the significance of the
social burden of excessive non-pecuniary damage awards.246 He
stated that “the sheer fact is that there is no objective yardstick for
translating non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering and loss
of amenities, into monetary terms” was reason enough to consider
“other policy factors” when evaluating the moderation of non-pecuniary damage awards.247
238

See Arnold, 2 S.C.R. at 332.
Id. at 333.
240
See id.
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See Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 263.
242
Id. (“In my opinion, this does not mean that the courts should not have
regard to the individual situation of the victim. On the contrary, they must do so
to determine what has been lost.”).
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Id.
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See Arnold, 2 S.C.R. at 334.
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3. Canadian Courts Beyond the Trilogy
Generally, after the Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases, Canadian
courts have “ignored the trilogy cases; paid lip service to them by
noting that they had considered the comments of the Supreme Court
in setting an award; distinguished them; or followed the Supreme
Court’s action in claiming to use the ‘functional’ approach . . . .”248
The following cases give examples and insight into these departures.
a. Lindal v. Lindal
Three years after the trilogy, in Lindal v. Lindal, the Supreme
Court of Canada discussed what circumstances would allow the trial
court to render an award that exceeded the non-pecuniary damage
cap set forth in the trilogy.249 The court followed the solace analysis,
concluding that it was not beneficial to quantify the difference in
worth between the losses caused by the severity of different injuries.250 In Lindal, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident
while riding as a passenger in his brother’s car.251 Lindal suffered
permanent and severe physical and mental impairments.252 The trial
court awarded CAD $135,000 in non-pecuniary damages, reasoning
that exceptional circumstances justified an award in excess of the
non-pecuniary damage award cap.253 The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court of Canada granted review.254 The
Supreme Court of Canada held that the caps may not be extended
based on the severity of a plaintiff’s injury alone or “to compensate
for loss of amenities, but rather to provide compensation for loss of
amenities in order to ameliorate the victim’s condition and make his
life more bearable.”255 The court stated that the circumstances that
justify exceeding the upper limit were extremely rare.256 However,
the court did agree that the limits may be altered due to changing

248
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Effron, supra note 119, at 217–18.
See Lindal, 2 S.C.R. at 629; see also Ayre, supra note 132, at 6.
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, supra note 1.
Veitch, supra note 140, at 117.
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Id.
See id.
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economic conditions or inflation.257 Justice Dickson noted that “it is
fruitless to attempt to put a dollar value on the loss of a faculty in
the way that we put a dollar value on the loss of a piece of property.”258 As in Andrews, Justice Dickson stressed the importance of
considering the social impact of non-pecuniary damage awards for
the following three reasons: (1) the awards for severely injured
plaintiffs may be virtually limitless; (2) plaintiffs are already wholly
compensated for loss of future earnings; and, (3) non-pecuniary
damages awards are not necessarily “compensatory.”259 While consenting that placing upper limits on non-pecuniary damage awards
is arbitrary, Justice Dickson thus endorsed the caps in personal injury cases.260 Ultimately, the court held that the circumstances in this
case did not justify exceeding the non-pecuniary damage cap even
though Lindal’s injuries were different from those suffered by the
plaintiffs in the trilogy.261
b. Ter Neuzen v. Korn
In 1995, in Ter Neuzen v. Korn,262 the Supreme Court of Canada
again reinforced the position that limits on non-pecuniary damage
awards were now a “rule of law.”263 There, the plaintiff contracted
HIV after undergoing artificial insemination.264 The jury awarded
CAD $460,000 in non-pecuniary damages, and the Court of Appeals
set aside the verdict.265 Similar to Lindal, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the circumstances that would warrant exceeding the
non-pecuniary damage award cap.266 The Supreme Court of Canada
cited Lindal and established that when a jury award surpasses the
rough upper limit, it should be reduced as a matter of law.267 As in
Lindal, the court held that although the plaintiff’s injuries differed
from that of the plaintiffs in the trilogy, the cost of the social burden
257
258
259
260
261
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263
264
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267
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outweighed that factor.268 Therefore, a non-pecuniary damage
award that exceeded the non-pecuniary damage cap would be inappropriate in this case.269
c. Lee v. Dawson
In 2006, Lee v. Dawson challenged the non-pecuniary damage
cap set forth by the trilogy.270 The seventeen-year-old plaintiff, Ik
Sang Lee, was injured in an automobile accident.271 The plaintiff
suffered a traumatic brain injury and severe physical injuries.272 The
jury awarded CAD $2,000,000 in non-pecuniary damages, exceeding the rough upper limit.273 The trial court subsequently reduced
the award to the upper limit, which was CAD $294,600 at the
time.274 The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal for British
Columbia, and the plaintiff cross-appealed seeking to reinstate the
jury’s damage award.275 The Supreme Court of Canada denied review without reason.276
The plaintiff argued that the non-pecuniary damage cap set forth
in the trilogy discriminated against persons injured in civil negligence actions, which was inconsistent with Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.277 Section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides an equality and non-discrimination guarantee.278 The plaintiff further asserted that the court
would not be bound by stare decisis if it found that the non-pecuniary damage cap set forth by the trilogy was inconsistent with the
values of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.279 The
268
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plaintiff argued that the damage limits resulted in deferential treatment, favoring plaintiffs who are not severely injured.280 The plaintiff further reasoned that, “[t]hose less seriously injured plaintiffs are
not subject to any limit because courts are to assess non-pecuniary
damages without regard for the upper limit until the limit is
reached.”281
While the court found the plaintiff’s argument persuasive, citing
Ter Neuzen and Lindal, the court held that it was bound by the trilogy.282 However, the court ultimately agreed that non-pecuniary
damage caps need to be revisited by the Supreme Court of Canada
in the future.283
In refusing to grant review without reason in Lee, the Supreme
Court of Canada dismissed “the opportunity to provide comprehensive guidance and current reasons on the status of the upper limit.”284
The Supreme Court of Canada has maintained that the law set forth
by the trilogy is binding precedent and remains good law.285
IV. ARGUMENT
Ultimately, this article argues that a recent and a critical shift is
taking place—namely, that the highest level of courts in American
States (like the Supreme Court of Florida) and Canadian Provinces
are holding statutory non-economic damage caps unconstitutional
as a violation of equal protection and that such trend will translate
to Canada as well. Not only does Canada continuously look to the
United States for guidance, but the statutory non-economic damage
caps do not serve the purpose suggested by the government. Further,
the purported policy reasons behind the caps lacks evidentiary support. In sum, this article predicts that because the Supreme Court of
Canada is not strictly bound by stare decisis, the Supreme Court of
Canada will follow the shift in the United States and hold that noneconomic damage caps violate equal protection.
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A. Comparing Lee and Kalitan: The Equal Protection Argument
The plaintiffs in both Lee and Kalitan asserted equal protection
arguments, questioning the constitutionality of the government imposed non-economic damage award caps.286
The Supreme Court of Florida was convinced in Kalitan that the
non-economic damage caps violated equal protection under the rational basis test.287 To meet the rational basis test, “a statute must
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective,” and cannot be arbitrarily imposed.288 Here, the plaintiff, Kalitan, met her
burden by proving that the statutory caps on personal injury noneconomic damages in medical negligence actions did not bear a rational relationship to the state of Florida’s objective of alleviating
the alleged medical malpractice crisis and such caps were arbitrarily
imposed.289 The court was convinced that the damage caps “created
arbitrary distinctions between classes of medical malpractice victims, and they unreasonably and arbitrarily limited recovery of those
most grievously injured by medical negligence.”290 Further, the
court agreed that “even if caps were rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose when the statute was enacted, no evidence of
continuing crisis justified arbitrary application of the caps that discriminated between medical malpractice victims.”291
The Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear Lee without reason.292 Although the Court of Appeals was convinced by plaintiff
Lee’s argument, the Court of Appeals was unable to overrule the
established precedent to rule in Lee’s favor.293 The plaintiff argued
that the non-pecuniary damage caps allowed those plaintiffs who
suffered less serious losses to be fully and fairly compensated, while
those plaintiffs suffering from more serious losses would not be.294
Further, the plaintiff asserted that “the fact that juries are not informed of the cap unless the plaintiff has sustained a serious injury
286
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underscores the point that plaintiffs with less serious injuries have
the advantage of a jury’s assessment of their damages without the
constraints imposed by the cap.”295 The plaintiff cited a decision of
the Supreme Court of Alabama, Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association.296 In Moore, the plaintiff, Moore, challenged a statutory noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice actions.297 The court
held that the cap was unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection because it favored those plaintiffs who were less severely injured.298 Similarly, Lee ultimately asserted that “[i]n failing to permit full compensation for serious injury and loss, the common law
perpetuates the disadvantage of people who are already disadvantaged.”299 Further, Lee stated that “the effect of the cap is the imposition of an extra layer of discrimination to the plight of the disabled
in our society, who, unfortunately, face many challenges as a result
of prevailing social attitudes and the lack of accessibility of jobs,
education, and society generally.”300 Lastly, Lee argued that the
non-pecuniary damage caps were selected arbitrarily, without “correspondence between the non-pecuniary damages available to a
plaintiff and the needs, capacity, or circumstances of the disabled
plaintiff.”301
As in Florida, one of the Supreme Court of Canada’s justifications of the non-pecuniary damage caps set forth in the trilogy was
the desire to avoid skyrocketing insurance premiums.302 However,
Lee argued that “a law that deprives plaintiffs of legitimate damages
in order to avoid an increase in premiums for other people, has a
discriminatory purpose.”303 Rejecting Lee’s argument, the court
cited Lindal, stating that “the Supreme Court of Canada has clearly
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indicated that the amount of non-pecuniary damages should not depend solely on the severity of the injury, ‘but upon its ability to ameliorate the condition of the victim considering his or her particular
situation.’”304 Lee asserted additional arguments to emphasize the
need to re-examine the justifications for the damage caps and the
“conceptual and practical difficulties” in its application.305 Additionally, Lee asserted that the trilogy’s purported “rough” upper limits have unintentionally become a strict rule of law, rather than a
guideline as it was originally intended.306 Further, the policy reasons
justifying the trilogy’s rough upper limit—namely, increased insurance premiums set over twenty-five years ago—no longer existed.307 Ultimately, the court agreed with the plaintiff, Lee, stating
that “the time may have come for the rationalization or conceptual
underpinning for having a rough upper limit on non-pecuniary damages to be re-examined.”308 However, the court felt that it was in no
position to overturn the precedent set forth in the trilogy.”309
B. The Justification for Statutory Damage Caps in Florida: The
Malpractice Liability Insurance Crisis
In McCall, the Florida Legislature (the “Legislature”) alleged
that the justification for the non-economic damage cap was “a medical malpractice insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude.”310
The Legislature noted that excessive damage awards by runaway juries resulted in increased malpractice liability insurance premiums.311 Furthermore, the Legislature asserted that increased malpractice liability insurance premiums resulted in the following: phy-

304
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sicians fleeing Florida, physicians retiring early, and physicians refusing to perform high-risk procedures.312 However, such allegations were unfounded.313 Government reports indicated an increased
number of physicians throughout Florida and provided no evidence
of increased frivolous lawsuits or exorbitant jury verdicts.314 Regardless of the existence of the medical malpractice liability insurance crisis, the non-economic damage caps would not alleviate such
a crisis.315 Ultimately, the plurality and concurring opinions in
McCall agreed that the existence of non-economic damages caps
would not lessen insurance rates.316 While the statutory damage caps
resulted in savings for insurance companies, such savings did not
translate to decreased insurance premiums for physicians.317 Further, the court reasoned that although the statutory caps may have
been enacted during a malpractice liability insurance crisis, a crisis
is not a permanent condition.318 Once again citing flexibility, the
court stated, “Conditions can change, which remove or negate the
justification for a law, transforming what may have once been reasonable into arbitrary and irrational legislation.”319 As a result, the
court in Kalitan adopted the findings of the court in McCall, that
there was no evidence of a continuing malpractice liability insurance
crisis in Florida.320 Furthermore, the court in Kalitan agreed that
even if a malpractice liability insurance crisis existed, the statutory
caps would not be justified.321
C. The Justifications for Statutory Damage Caps in Canada
Non-pecuniary damage award caps “unfairly impact those who
are victims of personal injury and whose situations could be improved by a reasonable award.”322 By upholding the non-pecuniary
damage award caps, the Supreme Court of Canada has essentially
312
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prioritized consistency and simplicity of judgments rather than justice for the most severely injured plaintiffs.323 The impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s “refusal to address the question posed by
Lee was to pass up the opportunity to provide comprehensive guidance and current reasons on the status of the upper limit.”324 Further,
as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s refusal to hear the
plaintiff’s argument in Lee, the constitutionality of the non-pecuniary damage caps remains uncertain.325 Future clarification is essential to resolve such ambiguity.326
The Supreme Court of Canada looked to the United States to
support its assertion that increased insurance premiums would result
from exorbitant damage awards.327 However, the evidence provided
was misleading and lacked factual backing.328 The Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision to enforce the non-pecuniary damage caps
“was based on an apprehension of crisis in the insurance industry
and the costs of insurance” and made without any material evidence.329 High damage awards and non-pecuniary loss are not the
sole reason for high insurance premiums.330 Other factors that increase insurance premiums include the following: “poor claims control, inadequate standards of practice and financial mismanagement.”331 Further, in reality, “[t]he perception of an insurance crisis
[in both the United States and Canada] was being fostered by a vigorous publicity campaign conducted by the insurance industry.”332
“If a decision is to be taken that someone who has been injured is to
be deprived, on the ground of social costs . . . that decision should
rest on a firmer basis than the cursory examination of the experience
of another jurisdiction.”333 Further, “[i]t is particularly troubling that
a misleading view of that experience may have been fostered by an
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extensive advertising campaign sponsored by interested parties.”334
Non-economic damage caps not only lack sufficient justification,
but the caps also fail to effectively lower insurance premiums.
D. Non-Economic Damage Caps: Do the Ends Justify the
Means?
As suggested in McCall and Kalitan, the non-economic damage
caps do not effectuate their stated purpose.335 The caps in Canada
also fail for similar reasons, as suggested in Lee.336 There is uncertainty as to the association between non-economic damage caps and
insurance premiums.337 However, “non-economic damage caps
seem to be only a small factor affecting increases in malpractice insurance rates.”338 Some studies conducted within the United States
suggest that damage caps effectively reduce medical liability insurance premiums.339 The presumption is that once non-economic damage caps are legislated, medical insurance providers reduce insurance premiums due to decreased risk exposure.340 However, in practice, states that have adopted non-economic damage caps show that
premiums are unlikely to be reduced due to uncertainty surrounding
the constitutionality of the damage award limits.341 Further, some
studies found no association between non-economic damage caps
and insurance premiums altogether.342
The principal advantages to the non-pecuniary damage caps include decreased litigation and increased judicial consistency and efficiency of evaluation of non-pecuniary loss.343 Namely, some nonpecuniary damage limit may be “essential to ensure consistency,
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fairness, and the application of rational principles in assessing damages for personal injury.”344 Non-pecuniary damage award caps may
be reasonable by allowing “a substantial sum of money to be allocated for the purchase of substitute pleasures without going to ridiculous extremes.”345 Non-pecuniary damages are unquantifiable
monetarily and are therefore necessarily arbitrary to some degree.346
Further, removing the non-pecuniary damage caps in Canada “may
upset the balance that has been arrived at in determining fair compensation.”347 However, doing away with damage award caps
“would not alter the fact that compensation for loss consists of interrelated considerations.”348
There are significant disadvantages to non-pecuniary damage
award caps, principally that non-pecuniary damage award caps violate the constitutional rights of plaintiffs.349 Such caps may be unnecessary to impose non-pecuniary damage awards and are unlikely
to increase, except to account for inflation.350 The non-pecuniary
damage caps created by the Supreme Court of Canada and continuously imposed by the trilogy have proven “not to be moderate but in
many cases wholly inadequate.”351 Non-pecuniary damage caps
have “created a situation where victims of massive injuries are receiving only marginally more than victims of less severe injuries.”352 Ultimately, “an upper limit, designed to suppress damages
for non-pecuniary loss to a moderate level, has affected the measurement of these damages at every level.”353
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An analysis of large Canadian claims found that non-pecuniary
damages made up 15% of the aggregate awards, while non-economic damages in United States medical negligence claims represented nearly half of the aggregate awards.354 Further, “empirical
studies in [Canada] have found that states355 with caps on damages
in medical malpractice cases have reduced overall claims severity
by 23% to 40%.”356 “Awards of increasingly high non-economic
damages in medical liability cases, with the resulting impact on the
cost of liability insurance and the availability of care in some cases,
led to the passage in many states of limits on non-economic damages
or, in some cases, to limits on total damages recoverable in medical
negligence actions.”357 Further, “a number of those limits were subsequently struck down by state courts as unconstitutional, although
a number were upheld, and the issue of limits on non-economic
damages remains a flash point in the debate over reform.”358
V. CONCLUSION
The future remains uncertain as to whether Canada will follow
the shift in the United States, and Florida specifically, and reverse
the trilogy to rule that non-economic damage award caps should be
eliminated altogether. The need for and the fairness of non-economic damage award caps has been repeatedly questioned in recent
years and will likely be the subject of litigation in the future.
In Kalitan, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the statutory
limits359 imposed on non-economic damages in medical negligence
suits violated the Florida Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.360
Similarly, in Lee, the plaintiff argued that the non-pecuniary damage
354
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cap set forth in the trilogy discriminated against persons injured in
civil negligence actions, which is inconsistent with Section Fifteen
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.361 Section Fifteen
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides an equality and non-discrimination guarantee.362 The court in Lee upheld the
non-pecuniary damage award cap because it was bound by stare
decisis, namely, the precedent established by the trilogy.363 Although the “rough” upper limit to non-pecuniary damage awards proposed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews was initially a
guideline, the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in Lindal essentially made such limit a rule of law.364 However, the court in Lee
reasoned that “the rationalization or conceptual underpinning for
having a rough upper limit on non-pecuniary damages [should] be
re-examined.”365 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada declined
to hear Lee without reason.366 Lee likely is not the last word on nonpecuniary damage award caps in Canada.367 It is still possible for the
Supreme Court of Canada to reassess its previous decisions, but
“[w]hen and whether that will happen, however, remains to be
seen.”368
There are significant disadvantages to non-pecuniary damage
award caps, principally that non-economic damage caps violate the
constitutional rights of plaintiffs.369 Non-pecuniary damage award
caps likely do not effectuate their stated purpose. The Supreme
Court of Canada looked to the United States to support its assertion
that increased insurance premiums would result from exorbitant
damage awards.370 However, the evidence provided is misleading
and lacks factual basis.371 The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
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to enforce the non-pecuniary damage caps “was based on an apprehension of crisis in the insurance industry and the costs of insurance,” without any material evidence, and was made nearly forty
years ago.372
There is significant doubt as to a correlation between non-economic damage caps and insurance premiums.373 Although there are
some advantages to the non-pecuniary damage award cap, including
decreased litigation and increased judicial consistency and efficiency of evaluation of non-pecuniary loss,374 such advantages
likely do not outweigh the substantial costs. The non-pecuniary
damage caps created by the Supreme Court of Canada and continuously imposed by the trilogy have proven “not to be moderate but in
many cases wholly inadequate.”375 Non-pecuniary damage caps
have “created a situation where victims of massive injuries are receiving only marginally more than victims of less severe injuries.”376 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada should revisit the
issue of the non-pecuniary damage award rough upper limits in the
interest of fairness and justice.377 The Supreme Court of Canada
should consider the shift in the United States and abolish the nonpecuniary damage award caps as they are unconstitutional.
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